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  Just three decades ago retirement saving in the United States was based 
heavily on employer-provided defined benefit plans.  Benefits after retirement were 
typically received in the form of lifetime annuities.  Today, personal retirement accounts 
(PRAs), which include 401(k)s, IRAs, Keoghs, and similar plans, have become the 
primary form of retirement saving for private-sector workers.  In 2008, according to the 
Brady, Holden and Short (2009), private sector PRA assets totaled $7.1 trillion while 
assets in traditional defined benefit programs totaled $2.0 trillion.  At the time of 
retirement, the PRA participant typically has sole control of the accumulated assets and 
can decide when to withdraw them.  To date, assets held in PRAs have rarely been 
annuitized.  This has raised concern that some participants will draw down assets 
precipitously and outlive their retirement assets.  In this paper, we present new 
evidence on how PRA assets are drawn down, focusing in particular on patterns in the 
early years of retirement.   
 
  Our work complements a number of recent studies that have investigated both 
the post-retirement utilization of PRAs and related issues of wealth accumulation or 
draw-down at older ages.  Bryant, Holden, and Sabelhaus (2010) use tax return data to 
study withdrawals from IRAs and defined contribution pension plans before plan 
beneficiaires reach age 60.  They find such distributions equal roughly 2.5 percent of 
underlying assets in recent years. Bershadker and Smith (2006) examine withdrawals 
from IRAs using tax returns for 2002.  They find that nearly half of taxpayers do not 
make any IRA withdrawals within the first two years of retirement, and they find that a 
substantial group of IRA holders waits until age 70 ½, the age at which required 
minimum distributions must commence, before making any withdrawals.  Love and 
Smith (2007) compare balances in IRAs and defined contribution retirement plans for 
households in several waves of the Health and Retirement Survey, and they find that 
the annuitized value of wealth rises from one wave to the next for most households.   
 
  It is important to distinguish between research on the age-related evolution of 
assets in retirement saving plans, and studies of age-wealth profiles more generally.  
Hurd (2002) studies a sample of households in the Asset and Health Dynamics among 
the Oldest Old (AHEAD) survey, and finds that total wealth declines with age when 
computed from a cross-section, but increases when computed from a panel. His study 
is one of the few that calculates profiles for individual categories of assets.  He finds 
that the same pattern of positive wave-to-wave changes holds for most asset 
categories including IRAs. He attributes the difference between cross-section and 
panel results to the presence of substantial cohort effects.  These cohort effects are 
particularly large for PRA assets because IRAs, 401(k)s and similar programs were not 
available to older persons.  Several other studies focus on the evolution of total wealth 
after retirement.  French, Doctor, and Baker (2007), using the AHEAD survey, find a 
modest decline in household wealth over the 1996-2004 period.  Love, Palumbo and 
Smith (2008) convert financial and non-financial assets -- including annuities from 
Social Security and DB pensions - into a measure of "annualized comprehensive 
wealth."  They find that this measure of wealth tends to rise with age following 
retirement.  A recent study by Hurd and Rohwedder (2010) calculates several different 
measures of wealth and saving and finds evidence that total wealth declines with age  
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for singles, but not for couples. With the exception of Hurd (2002), none of these 
studies separately distinguishes wealth held in PRAs from wealth held in other settings.  
Poterba, Venti, and Wise (2010a) suggest that wealth trajectories vary substantially 
across older households, with family status transitions playing a particularly important 
role in distinguishing those with rising and stable or declining wealth.  Studying the 
evolution of PRA assets, as we do in the current paper, does not directly address the 
question of how total wealth evolves in retirement.  Since retirement plan assets 
represent the largest source of financial assets for a substantial share of retirees, 
however, whether these assets are preserved is a potentially important issue for a 
substantial group of older households.   
 
  The current exploration of draw-down patterns from PRAs parallels earlier 
investigations of the draw-down of housing equity.  Venti and Wise (1990, 2001, 2004) 
found that home equity was typically not used to support general consumption in 
retirement, but instead tended to be used in the event of shocks to family status, like 
death of a spouse, or entry into a nursing home.  They concluded that home equity, the 
primary asset of a large fraction of families, was conserved for a “rainy day.”   
Megbolugbe, Sa-Aadu, and Shilling (1997) and Banks, Blundell, Oldfield and Smith 
(2007) also find that the drawdown of home equity is typically associated with shocks.  
Davidoff (2007) suggests that one reason for the slow draw-down of housing equity is 
the desire of homeowners to preserve their home equity as a potential source of 
funding for large health expenses.   
 
Our analysis relies primarily on data from the Survey of Income and Program 
Participation (SIPP), but it also draws on information in the Health and Retirement 
Study (HRS).  Our central finding is that PRA assets, like home equity, tend to be 
conserved in the early retirement years.  Withdrawal rates are low following retirement 
until account-holders attain age of 70½, the age at which required minimum 
distributions (RMDs) from traditional IRAs and 401(k) plans must begin.  At age 70 1/2, 
the proportion of households reporting withdrawals jumps from about 20 percent to 
over 60 percent.  Despite the large jump in the probability that assets are withdrawn at 
this age, the overall proportion of assets withdrawn continues to be a small proportion 
of the PRA balance.  This withdrawal ratio averages between one and two percent 
between ages 60 and 69, and rises to about 5 percent at age 70 ½.  It fluctuates 
around that level through age 85.  When investment returns and contributions to PRAs 
from the subset of households in this age range who are still employed exceed this 
withdrawal rate, it is possible for average PRA assets to rise with age, even after age 
70 ½.  This is the pattern that we observe for the time period we investigate.  This 
result supports our second broad finding: while there is substantial heterogeneity 
across households, only a small proportion of households draw down PRA assets 
precipitously either before or after age 70 1/2.   
 
  The paper is divided into six sections.  In the first, we describe the growth of 
PRAs, using a cohort description of the data, and we emphasize the strong relationship 
between individual attributes—earnings, non-PRA wealth, health status, and other 
attributes—and the probability of having a PRA.  In section two, we describe the  
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evolution of within-cohort PRA balances as each cohort ages.  We find that assets 
increase with age even after retirement.  We also report the relationship between PRA 
assets and household attributes such as marital status, income, assets and health. In 
the next three sections we consider the withdrawal of PRA assets in more detail.  
Section three explores the relationship between household attributes and the 
probability that a household with a PRA makes a withdrawal from the account.  Section 
four presents evidence on the percent of the PRA balance that is withdrawn, 
conditional on a withdrawal.  The fifth section reports summary information on the 
proportion of households that withdraw more than a given percent of their PRA balance 
in a given year.  This offers evidence on the proportion of households that are drawing 
down their PRA assets rapidly.  There is a brief conclusion.   
 
1.  SIPP Data for Tracking PRA Ownership  
 
We describe the spread of PRA accounts using SIPP data organized by cohort. 
The SIPP data are available for calendar years 1997, 1998, 1999, 2001, 2002, 2004 
and 2005.
1   We define PRA assets as the sum of the responses to the three SIPP 
questions that ask about holdings of "IRAs", "Keoghs" and "401(k), 403(b) or thrift 
plans".  Summary data on the number of observations, PRA participation rates and 
PRA assets, by age and by year are presented in Table 1-1.   In this table the "age" of 
two-person households is assumed to be the age of the male household member.  For 
consistency with our subsequent tables, in which we consider withdrawals from PRA 
plans in the twelve months after the balance is reported, Table 1-1 only includes 
households who remained in the sample for at least twelve months after the PRA 
balance was reported.
2 
 
Simple comparisons of the findings from various waves of the SIPP show that 
the likelihood of respondents having assets in a personal retirement account, and the 
mean PRA balance (in $2000), increase over time.  In each wave of the survey, both 
the probability of PRA ownership and the average PRA balance conditional on 
ownership decline with age.   
 
  For tracking the evolution of PRA participation and for analyzing how account 
balances vary for PRA participants as they age, it is helpful to organize the SIPP data 
                                                 
1 The 1997, 1998 and 1999 data are from waves 3, 6, and 9 of the 1996 SIPP panel.  The 2001 and 
2002 data are from waves 3 and 6 of the 2001 SIPP panel.  The 2004 and 2005 data are from waves 3 
and 6 of the 2004 SIPP panel. 
2 Restricting the sample to include only respondents who remain in the sample for 12 months after the 
PRA balance is reported excludes between 11 and 17 percent of the respondent in each year between 
1997 and 2004.  For 2005, 61 percent of the respondents are excluded because the sample size was 
reduced beginning with wave 8 of the 2004 panel.  A second restriction is also applied.  For about two 
percent of the sample the sum of monthly withdrawals exceeds the initial asset balance, typically 
because the household reports a zero initial PRA balance, but positive subsequent withdrawals.  These 
respondents may have established new "rollover" PRAs (perhaps cash-outs from  DB pensions) in the 
subsequent 12 months.  We have also excluded these respondents from the analysis.   
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by cohort.  For example, we can obtain data for 60-year-old households in 1997, 61-
year-old households in 1998, and track this cohort through 68-year-old households in 
2005.  We identify each cohort by its age in 1997:  "C60" refers to the cohort that was 
age 60 in 1997.  These cohort data contain data from three distinct panel data sets that 
span shorter time periods.  The same persons responded to the SIPP surveys in 1997, 
1998, 1999, and 2000.  Another sample responded in 2001 and 2002, and a third 
sample responded in 2004 and 2005.  We treat the nine-year cohort data set as though 
it is drawn from a synthetic panel.   
 
50-59 60-69 70-79 80-85 All
1997 4,821 3,484 3,308 1,800 13,413
1998 4,615 3,330 3,178 1,195 12,318
1999 4,778 3,294 3,167 1,183 12,422
2001 4,554 3,039 2,556 1,135 11,284
2002 4,576 3,097 2,523 1,062 11,258
2004 6,810 4,594 3,454 2,447 17,305
2005 3,157 2,105 1,600 789 7,651
All 33,311 22,943 19,786 9,611 85,651
1997 43.8 38.6 24.0 6.6 32.6
1998 45.5 40.4 26.4 10.5 36.1
1999 46.8 40.0 27.8 13.1 37.3
2001 49.4 41.0 30.0 16.9 39.7
2002 50.6 44.4 30.7 19.2 41.8
2004 57.3 50.2 37.9 18.6 46.3
2005 56.5 51.9 35.7 22.7 47.8
All 50.0 43.4 29.9 15.0 40.0
1997 $25,491 $26,069 $13,173 $2,747 $19,620
1998 $30,593 $29,341 $15,849 $4,983 $24,181
1999 $37,848 $35,836 $20,980 $8,709 $30,557
2001 $42,610 $38,656 $21,799 $11,234 $33,917
2002 $37,382 $42,557 $24,693 $12,384 $33,803
2004 $52,953 $54,460 $38,005 $15,489 $45,216
2005 $57,367 $64,251 $39,415 $20,201 $51,980
All $40,468 $40,675 $23,631 $10,512 $33,554
1997 2,036 1,264 733 111 4,144
1998 2,047 1,269 777 117 4,210
1999 2,203 1,242 821 143 4,409
2001 2,202 1,182 723 184 4,291
2002 2,238 1,300 724 197 4,459
2004 3,855 2,225 1,239 451 7,770
2005 1,748 1,026 541 179 3,494
All 16,329 9,508 5,558 1,382 32,777
1997 58190 67589 54999 41919 60110
1998 $67,217 $72,611 $60,067 $47,263 $67,043
1999 $80,826 $89,667 $75,589 $66,305 $81,983
2001 $86,241 $94,329 $72,675 $66,326 $85,417
2002 $73,901 $95,845 $80,404 $64,475 $80,948
2004 $92,464 $108,571 $100,150 $83,242 $97,705
2005 $101,503 $123,708 $110,544 $88,864 $108,797
All $80,888 $93,621 $79,107 $69,897 $83,876
Number of observations (households with a PRA)
Mean PRA balance (households with a PRA)
Mean PRA balance
Table 1-1.  Summary data, by age interval and year from the SIPP
Age interval Year
Number of observations
Percent with positive PRA balance
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Figure 1-1 shows the percent of households with positive PRA balances for 
seven cohorts whose members were between the ages of 51 and 84 in 1997.  The first 
(partial) cohort shown in the figure was 45 years old in 1997.  Households in this cohort 
were observed only at age 52 in 2004 and at age 53 in 2005.  The first complete cohort 
shown in the figure was 51 years old in 1997.  When first observed at age 51, 44 
percent of the households in this cohort had positive PRA balances.  By 2005, when 
they were 59, 56.4 percent had positive PRA balances.  
 
This figure shows large differences between cohorts, which we interpret as 
"cohort effects."  Younger cohorts, those who reach a given age in a later year, are 
more likely to have a PRA than older cohorts.  For example, 56.4 percent of the 
households that were 59 years old in 2005 had a PRA positive balance, but six years 
earlier, only 45 percent of the 59-year-old households had a PRA.  This “cohort effect” 
equals the vertical distance between the two circled observations in the figure. 
 
The presence of substantial cohort effects is not surprising given the growth of 
retirement saving plans during the last three decades.  IRAs became broadly available 
in 1981, and 401(k) plans were not widely embraced by corporations until the early 
1980s, although many firms did not adopt them until much later.  Workers who were 51 
years old in 2005 were 28 in 1982, so they were potentially “exposed” to 401(k) plans 
for 23 years.  In contrast, 83 year olds in 1999 were 66 in 1982; they are much less 
likely to have been able to participate in a retirement saving plan before they retired. 
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  While Figure 1-1 highlights the rapid spread of PRAs in the past three decades, 
it does not reveal the correlations of PRA ownership with household attributes such as 
earnings, non-PRA wealth holdings, and health status.  These correlations can be 
important for understanding the evolution of PRA ownership, since it is possible that 
some of the age-related or cohort-related variation in PRA ownership rates may reflect 
age-varying or cohort-varying household attributes that are predictive of PRA 
ownership.  These correlations are also important for the information that they provide 
about the attributes of the households who are making decisions about whether to draw 
down PRA assets. 
 
To summarize the relationship between PRA ownership and various household 
attributes, we estimate probit models relating an indicator variable for whether a 
household has a positive PRA balance to a set of indicator variables for household age, 
a set of indicator variables for cohort (again measured as age of household head in 
1997), and a set of other household attributes.  The latter includes an indicator variable 
for whether the household is retired, an indicator variable for marital status, a measure 
of self-reported health status, earned income, annuity income, housing wealth, and 
non-housing wealth.  Since we have chosen to include both age and cohort effects in 
our specification, we cannot separately identify time effects.  
 
Table 1-2 presents estimates of the resulting probit specifications, showing in 
each case the marginal relationship between each household attribute and the 
probability of having a PRA.  The first column reports estimated age and cohort effects 
without controlling for other household attributes; it essentially replicates the profiles 
shown in Figure 1-1.  Each cohort includes households in a three year age window.  
For example, cohort C54 includes cohorts C53, C54, and C55.  The difference between 
the probability derivatives for the C42 cohort (the base cohort) and the C84 cohort is 
0.855: a household in the oldest cohort in 1997 has an 85.5 percent lower probability of 
having a PRA, all else equal, than a household in the youngest cohort in 1997. 
 
In modeling age effects, we allow for differences before and after a household 
reaches age 63.  We do this with a piecewise linear function with a break at age 63.  
The probability of having a PRA increases with age through age 63, but there is little 
effect of age after age 63.  This is consistent with PRA accounts being opened while 
households are employed, but not after retirement.   
 
The specification in the second column of Table 1-2 adds variables 
corresponding to five sets of household attributes to the specification in the first 
column.  The first set of variables, in this case only a single variable, is an indicator for 
whether the household is retired or still working.  In the case of married households, we 
make this determination based on whether the husband is still working.  The second 
set of variables describes the household’s marital status--single female, single male, or 
married.  The third set of variables describes household income; we distinguish earned 
income and annuity income.  The fourth set of variables describes household wealth, 
which we divide into housing wealth and non-housing, non-PRA wealth.  The fifth set of  
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variables captures self-reported health status.  Each respondent can indicate poor, fair, 
good, very good, or excellent.  We collapse these responses into two categories, "very 
good or excellent" and "fair or poor" ("good" is the excluded category).  Estimates for 
each of the health status groups are obtained separately for single persons, married 
males and married females.   Finally, all of the attributes are interacted with an indicator 
for whether the household is above or below the age of 63.  We use this same set of 
household attributes in later explorations of PRA asset balances and withdrawal 
behavior, although in some case we replace the interaction with pre- and post-age 63 
with an interaction with different age breaks.   
 
(1) (2) (1) (2)
Coef Z- Coef Z-score Coef Z-score Coef Z-score
spline in age health status - single persons
   Age ≤63 0.012 11.64 0.017 14.33   VG or excellent if age ≤63 0.115 13.00
   Age>63 -0.001 -1.33 -0.005 -4.48    VG or excellent if age>63 0.066 7.28
cohort effects    Fair or poor if age ≤63 -0.217 -19.34
   Age 45 in 1997 -0.043 -2.57 -0.048 -2.61    Fair of poor if age>63 -0.169 -16.91
   Age 48 in 1997 -0.084 -5.20 -0.097 -5.36 health status - married male
   Age 51 in 1997 -0.123 -7.66 -0.148 -8.17    VG or excellent if age ≤63 0.013 1.43
   Age 54 in 1997 -0.155 -8.86 -0.180 -9.11    VG or excellent if age>63 0.025 2.40
   Age 57 in 1997 -0.226 -11.87 -0.258 -12.04    Fair or poor if age ≤63 -0.106 -9.21
   Age 60 in 1997 -0.269 -13.30 -0.290 -12.92    Fair of poor if age>63 -0.085 -7.99
   Age 63 in 1997 -0.320 -15.17 -0.332 -14.12 health status - married female
   Age 66 in 1997 -0.350 -16.04 -0.327 -13.34    VG or excellent if age ≤63 0.058 6.59
   Age 69 in 1997 -0.371 -16.41 -0.316 -12.60    VG or excellent if age>63 0.064 6.33
   Age 72 in 1997 -0.408 -17.05 -0.324 -12.25    Fair or poor if age ≤63 -0.051 -4.42
   Age 75 in 1997 -0.484 -18.80 -0.380 -13.36    Fair of poor if age>63 -0.071 -6.53
   Age 78 in 1997 -0.580 -20.81 -0.436 -14.20 Intercept -0.553 -10.04 -1.069 -16.54
   Age 81 in 1997 -0.669 -21.85 -0.528 -15.66
   Age 84 in 1997 -0.855 -23.10 -0.671 -16.38 number of observations 85,651 85,651
self-reported retirement status Wald chi2(2) 4,986 11,694
   retired if age≤63 0.029 3.60 Prob > chi2  0.0000 0.0000
   retired if age>63 -0.081 -8.31 Pseudo R2    0.0555 0.2009
marital status
   Single male if age ≤63 -0.057 -6.83
   Single male if age>63 -0.008 -0.89
   Married if age ≤63 0.059 5.15
   Married if age>63 0.096 8.82
income
   Earned income if age ≤63 0.036 18.32
   Earned income if age>63 0.024 9.34
   Annuity income if age ≤63 0.016 4.82
   Annuity income if age>63 0.069 24.46
wealth (in 10,000's)
   Housing wealth if age ≤63 0.005 15.17
   Housing wealth if age>63 0.007 23.83
   Nonhousing wealth if age ≤63 0.001 4.41
   Nonhousing wealth if age>63 0.000 2.37
Table 1-2 Estimated probability of having a PRA account, probit marginal effects, households age 50 to 85
Variable Variable
 
 
The estimates suggest that there are substantial differences across households 
with different attributes in the probability of PRA ownership.  Two findings deserve 
particular note.  First, the reduction in the estimated cohort effects when household 
attributes are added suggests that the cohort effects estimated in the first column 
reflect, in part, the change over time in household attributes. The addition of household 
attributes reduces the difference between the youngest and oldest (omitted) cohort 
from 0.855 to 0.671.  This difference appears primarily to be the result of including  
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income and wealth variables in the specification.  Second, holding other attributes 
constant, the marginal estimates together with the associated z-scores show that 
married households, those with greater earned income, with greater annuity income, 
and with greater wealth in either housing equity or other assets are more likely to report 
a positive PRA balance.  Persons in better health are also more likely to have a PRA. 
 
To illustrate the quantitative importance of these findings, we can focus on 
several examples.  Among those under 63 years of age, a married person is 11.6 
percent more likely to have a PRA than a single man is.  For someone under the age of 
63, a $10,000 increase in earned income is associated with a 3.6 percent increase in 
the probability of having a PRA.  For persons over the age of 63, and likely to be 
retired, a $10,000 increase in annuity income is associated with a 6.9 percent increase 
in the probability of having a PRA.   For persons under the age of 63, each $10,000 
increase in housing wealth is associated with roughly a 0.5 percentage point increase 
in the probability of having a PRA; the effect of the same addition to non-housing 
wealth is only about 0.1 percentage points.   
 
The results in Table 1-2 also display a strong relationship between health status 
and the probability of PRA ownership.  Controlling for the other household attributes 
that are included in the probit models, persons in poor health are much less likely than 
persons in good health to have a PRA.  For example, among those who are not yet 63 
years of age, single persons in very good or excellent health are 33 percent more likely 
to have a PRA than are those in fair or poor health.  For married men (women) the 
difference is 12 (11) percent.  This finding complements results in Poterba, Venti, and 
Wise (2010c) that suggest that 
households in good health near 
retirement age have higher lifetime 
earnings than those in poor health, 
greater earnings at retirement, greater 
annuity income after retirement, and 
more non-retirement account wealth.   
  
To illustrate the findings in 
Table 1-2, in Table 1-3 we report the 
probability of PRA ownership for four 
hypothetical households with different 
sets of attributes.  These probabilities 
are computed using the coefficient 
estimates that underlie the marginal 
probability effects in Table 1-2.  We 
focus on households between the 
ages of 60 and 63, and consider 
separately households who are not yet 
retired and households that are retired.  
We consider “low-percentile” 
households with low income (10
th 
60 to 63 60 to 63
Not retired
Marital status Single Male. Married
Earned income 10th pctile 90th pctile
Annuity income 0 0
Housing wealth 10th pctile 90th pctile
Nonhousing wealth 10th pctile 90th pctile
Health Fair-Poor Ex-VG
Probability 0.083 0.804
Retired
Marital status Single Male. Married
Earned income 0 0
Annuity income 10th pctile 90th pctile
Housing wealth 10th pctile 90th pctile
Nonhousing wealth 10th pctile 90th pctile
Health Fair-Poor Ex-VG
Probability 0.095 0.632
Attributes and 
probability
Age
Table 1-3.  Probability of having a PRA, for 
selected attributes. 
  10
percentile), low wealth, and poor health, and “high-percentile” households with high 
income (90
th percentile), high wealth, and good health.  The 10
th and 90
th percentiles 
approximate persons in the bottom and top quintiles of each attribute.  For low-
percentile households that are not retired, the predicted probability of PRA ownership is 
only about 8 percent.  By comparison, for the high-percentile non-retired households, 
the predicted probability is 80 percent.  For retired households in this age range, about 
10 percent of the low-percentile households are predicted to have a PRA, compared to 
about 63 percent of high-percentile households.  These summary measures 
underscore the importance of household attributes in potentially explaining differences 
in PRA ownership.   
 
2.  Balances in PRAs    
 
Since we are interested in the amount withdrawn from PRAs, we need to 
consider not just the ownership of these accounts but also the balances in these 
accounts.  Figure 2-1 shows average PRA balances (in $2000) at each age for 
selected cohorts labeled by the cohort age in 1997.   As in our earlier analysis, the data 
are for 1997, 1998, 1999, 2001, 2002, 2004, and 2005.  The figure suggests two key 
conclusions.  First, younger cohorts have higher average PRA asset levels at each 
age.  Second, in most cases, within cohorts for which we have at least two years of 
data, assets tend to increase as the cohort ages.  This pattern, while common, is not 
universal.  Several cohorts show a decline in assets between 1999 and 2002, most 
likely reflecting the decline in stock prices following the dot-com bubble.  The general 
pattern suggests that for most ages and cohorts, the increase in asset balances arising 
from new contributions and from returns on existing balances exceeds the reduction in 
assets due to withdrawals.  In comparing the average PRA balances as cohorts age, 
but while many members of the cohort are still in the labor force, there are potentially 
four distinct effects at work: the investment return and contribution effects that increase 
existing PRA balances, the withdrawal effect that reduces them, and the “new account 
opening” effect that adds low-balance new accounts into the set of PRAs over which 
we average to compute the cohort mean PRA balance.  Thus even if PRA balances 
rose for all existing PRA holders at a given age, it would still be possible in principle for 
the average PRA balance to decline as the cohort aged.  Our findings suggest that this 
effect does not play a dominant role.   
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Figure 2-1. Mean PRA balances for households 
with a PRA, selected cohorts
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  To identify the household attributes that are associated with high and low levels 
of PRA assets, we specify a simple model for these balances (B ): 
 
(1)   
i Z
ii Be
     
                                  
where i Z is a vector that includes age and cohort effects, as well as the same set of 
household attributes as in our foregoing analysis of the probability of reporting a 
positive PRA balance.  Now, the estimated coefficients ( ) are the estimated 
percentage change inB that would be associated with a unit change in the 
corresponding i Z variable.  We estimate (1) by nonlinear least squares (NLLS) for all 
households with a positive PRA balance.  We also experimented with a log-linear 
counterpart to (1), estimating the log of i B as a linear function of the i Z  variables.  The fit 
of the model in (1) was substantially better than that of the corresponding log-linear 
model, so we report the estimates from it.   
 
  Table 2-1 reports the results of estimating (1) by NLLS.  We begin in column one 
with a simple specification that includes only age and cohort effects, and then add the 
additional family attributes.  The age estimates are specified as piecewise linear with 
breaks at 69 and 71 to allow for a change in asset evolution at the age of the required 
minimum distribution (RMD).  For households below the age of 69, the estimates  
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indicate that PRA assets increase 4.3 percent per year.  Between ages 69 and 71, the 
age at which households must begin to make required minimum distributions (RMDs), 
the estimates show essentially no change in assets.  At ages above 71, PRA assets 
increase at an average rate of 2.6 percent per year.  These findings suggest that over 
our data period, asset returns and the contributions of our still-working sample 
members more than offset asset outflows due to withdrawals as well as the “small 
account opening effect” for working-age cohorts.  We observe the pattern of rising 
average PRA balances both before and after cohorts reach age 70 ½ and need to 
begin RMD withdrawals. The estimates in column 1 also show substantial cohort 
effects, similar to those observed in Figure 2-1.   
 
(1) (2) (1) (2)
Coef Z-score Coef Z-score Coef Z-score Coef Z-score
spline in age health status - single persons
   Age≤69 0.043 12.84 0.029 7.47    VG or excellent if age≤69 0.233 6.48
   69<age≤71 -0.010 -0.51 0.030 0.65    VG or excellent if 69<age<72 0.161 1.34
   Age>71 0.026 3.69 0.020 2.40    VG or excellent if age≥72 0.169 2.35
cohort effects    Fair or poor if age≤69 -0.126 -2.06
   Age 45 in 1997 -0.027 -0.46 0.044 0.67    Fair or poor if 69<age<72 -0.047 -0.27
   Age 48 in 1997 -0.035 -0.59 0.002 0.02    Fair or poor if age≥72 0.095 1.05
   Age 51 in 1997 -0.117 -1.98 -0.063 -0.97 health status - married male
   Age 54 in 1997 -0.184 -2.93 -0.100 -1.44    VG or excellent if age≤69 0.120 5.19
   Age 57 in 1997 -0.248 -3.64 -0.156 -2.04    VG or excellent if 69<age<72 -0.206 -2.23
   Age 60 in 1997 -0.360 -4.87 -0.221 -2.68    VG or excellent if age≥72 0.014 0.25
   Age 63 in 1997 -0.454 -5.70 -0.318 -3.58    Fair or poor if age≤69 -0.201 -4.87
   Age 66 in 1997 -0.624 -7.41 -0.409 -4.41    Fair or poor if 69<age<72 -0.129 -1.06
   Age 69 in 1997 -0.787 -8.92 -0.517 -5.33    Fair or poor if age≥72 0.096 1.38
   Age 72 in 1997 -0.879 -9.33 -0.590 -5.65 health status - married female
   Age 75 in 1997 -1.087 -10.43 -0.745 -6.41    VG or excellent if age≤69 0.125 5.24
   Age 78 in 1997 -1.275 -10.84 -0.929 -7.17    VG or excellent if 69<age<72 0.259 2.59
   Age 81 in 1997 -1.356 -9.56 -1.049 -6.64    VG or excellent if age≥72 0.189 3.40
   Age 84 in 1997 -1.283 -5.51 -0.867 -3.43    Fair or poor if age≤69 -0.059 -1.53
self-reported retirement status    Fair or poor if 69<age<72 -0.162 -0.99
   retired if age≤69 0.008 0.30    Fair or poor if age≥72 0.013 0.19
   retired if 69<age<72 0.122 1.02
   retired if age≥72 -0.051 -0.48 Alpha 0.860 5.70 0.721 4.81
marital status
   Single male if age≤69 0.360 11.02 number of observations 32,777 32,777
   Single male if 69<age<72 0.066 0.60 RMSE 10.1208 9.4233
   Single male if age≥72 0.400 5.98
   Married if age≤69 0.512 12.53
   Married if 69<age<72 0.389 2.87
   Married if age≥72 0.482 6.17
income sources (in 10,000s)
   Earned income if age≤69 0.020 14.79
   Earned income if 69<age<72 -0.005 -0.31
   Earned income if age≥72 0.018 2.95
   Annuity income if age≤69 0.069 9.46
   Annuity income if 69<age<72 0.077 4.31
   Annuity income if age≥72 0.048 3.64
wealth (in 10,000's)
   Housing wealth if age≤69 0.011 17.46
   Housing wealth if 69<age<72 0.012 6.54
   Housing wealth if age≥72 0.012 8.48
   Nonhousing wealth if age≤69 0.000 7.41
   Nonhousing wealth if 69<age<72 0.001 6.24
   Nonhousing wealth if age≥72 0.000 6.27
Variable Variable
Table 2-1 NLLS estimates of PRA balance for households with a PRA account, households age 50 to 85
 
 
We can use the estimated age and cohort estimates from the first column of 
Table 2-1 to predict PRA balances for any cohort at any age.  These are shown in 
Figure 2-2.  For example, households that attained age 63 in 2003, which were 
therefore members of the C57 cohort (they were 57 in 1997), are predicted to hold PRA 
assets of $98,869 at age 63, while households that attained age 63 six year earlier in  
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1997 are predicted to hold PRA assets of only $80,505 – a 23 percent difference.  
Figure 2-2 also shows 95 percent confidence bands for these two predictions.   
 
F 2-2.  Predicted PRA balance for households with 
a PRA, using estimates from exponential model 
(NLLS), with confidence intervals
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The estimates in the second column of Table 2-1 describe the relationship 
between PRA balances and household attributes.  We use the same set of household 
attributes as in the foregoing estimates, but we now interact each household attribute 
with three age segments: less than age 69, age 69 to 71, and greater than age 71. The 
marginal estimates, like those for the probability of having a PRA, show that average 
balances are higher for those who are married, have greater earned income or annuity 
income, have greater housing wealth and greater non-housing wealth, and are in better 
health. Among households under the age of 69, married men have 36 percent more in 
PRA assets than single females (the omitted group) and married households have 51 
percent more in PRA assets than single females.  An additional $10,000 in earned 
income is associated with 2 percent more in PRA assets, and an additional $10,000 in 
annuity income is associated with a 6.9 percent increase in PRA wealth.   An additional 
$10,000 in housing wealth is associated with a 1.1 percent increase in PRA assets; an 
additional $10,000 in non-housing wealth with an increase of 0.03 percentage points 
(rounded to zero in Table 2-1) in PRA assets.  Single persons in very good or excellent 
heath have 36 percent more in PRA assets than single persons in fair or poor health.  
This difference is 32 percent for married men and 18 percent for married women.    
 
Table 2-2 illustrates the combined impact of different sets of household 
attributes on PRA balances, using the same approach that we applied in the previous  
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section.  We again consider 
households between the ages of 60 
and 63, and use the same “low-
percentile” and “high-percentile” sets 
of attributes as above.  The first 
column of Table 2-2 shows the 
predicted PRA balance for a 
household with low income, low 
wealth, and poor health.  The next 
column shows the balance for a 
household with high income, high 
wealth, and good health.  For 
households in the 60 to 63 age range 
who are not retired, the predicted 
balance for households in the low-
percentile group is $45,984, compared 
to $134,167 for those in the high-
percentile group.  For households in 
this age group who are retired, the 
values are $46,281 and $139,182, 
respectively.   
 
 
 
3.  The Probability of a PRA Withdrawal  
 
Having set the stage with analysis of the ownership of PRAs and average age- 
and cohort-specific balances, we now examine data on PRA withdrawals.  We begin by 
using data from the SIPP to calculate withdrawals from all personal retirement accounts 
as a proportion of balances.  Respondents are asked to provide the amount received 
from a draw on an IRA, Keogh, 401(k) or Thrift Plan in each month during the 1997 to 
2005 period.  Recall that they are also asked to provide balances in these various 
accounts at seven different points in time between 1997 and 2005.  We calculate the 
annual withdrawal rate as the sum of all withdrawals during the twelve months following 
a month in which the balance is reported, divided by the reported balance.  In this 
section we examine the probability of any withdrawal during a twelve month period, and 
in the next we analyze withdrawals as a percentage of the PRA balance.   
 
Figure 3-1 combines data from all of the SIPP cohorts and shows the age-
specific probability of a withdrawal from a PRA.  These are the vertical bars in the 
figure.  The entry for each age combines data from several cohorts, so it pools 
information from households who were that age in different years.  As we will show 
below, the cohort effects are negligible for this series.  The percentage of households 
making a withdrawal grows slowly from about 10 at age 60 to about 23 at age 69.  
Between the ages of 69 and 71, however, it jumps to over 60, and it fluctuates around 
70 for households over the age of 73.  Overall, Figure 3-1 suggests that at ages prior to 
60 to 63 60 to 63
Not retired
Marital status Single Male. Married
Earned income 10th pctile 90th pctile
Annuity income 0 0
Housing wealth 10th pctile 90th pctile
Nonhousing wealth 10th pctile 90th pctile
Health Fair-Poor Ex-VG
PRA balance $45,894 $134,167
Retired
Marital status Single Male. Married
Earned income 0 0
Annuity income 10th pctile 90th pctile
Housing wealth 10th pctile 90th pctile
Nonhousing wealth 10th pctile 90th pctile
Health Fair-Poor Ex-VG
PRA balance $46,281 $139,182
Table 2-2.  Estimated PRA balance, for selected 
attributes.
Attributes and 
balance
Age 
  15
70 ½, most households with PRAs are not making withdrawals.  The probability of 
making a withdrawal only exceeds fifty percent after age 70 ½, and even then, is well 
below one hundred percent.   
 
One of the most surprising features of Figure 3-1 is that the withdrawal rate is 
well below 100 percent following the age at which RMDs commence.  In part, this is 
because holders of Roth IRAs (and holders of Keoghs if they are still working) are not 
subject to required minimum distributions, which apply to traditional IRAs and to 
rollover IRAs. Among households age 72 to 85 in the SIPP, the withdrawal rate for 
households with zero earnings is 8 percentage points higher than the rate for 
households with earnings.  An 2010 Investment Company Institute report by Holden 
and Schrass (2010b) reports that 28.9 percent of all IRAs are Roth IRAs and 40.1 
percent of households with an IRA have a Roth IRA (many households have multiple 
IRAs).  A recent EBRI study by Copeland (2009), based on data from the 2007 Survey 
of Consumer Finances, reports that that 31.7 percent of households with an IRA have 
at least one Roth IRA.  Because Roth IRAs are a relatively recent phenomenon, the 
fraction of elderly households owning Roth IRAs is likely to be lower than the fraction of 
all households owning Roth IRAs, but is nonetheless likely to be substantial.  
 
Another explanation of the withdrawal probability below 100 percent for 
households over the age of 70 ½ is that in married couples, the owner of the PRA may 
be the wife, and she may be younger than the husband, whose age was used to 
determine the household’s “age.”  If the wife is not yet 70 ½, she is not required to 
make a distribution from her PRA.   
 
Other data sources also show withdrawal rates well under 100 percent for 
households older than the RMD age.  The Investment Company Institute’s IRA Owners 
Survey, which is summarized in Holden and Schrass (2010a), finds that only 73 
percent of households aged 70 or older with a traditional IRA made a withdrawal in 
2008, 70 percent in 2009 and 53 percent in 2010 (the RMD was suspended in tax year 
2010).  Tabulations of IRS data on IRAs compiled by Bryant and Sailer (2006) show 
that 82.6 percent of households headed by someone between the ages of 70 to 75, 
81.7 percent of those headed by someone between the ages of 75 and 80, and only 
61.8 percent of households headed by someone over the age of 80 made distributions 
in tax year 2001.   Unpublished tablulations from the Survey of Consumer Finances by 
the Investment Company Institute suggest somewhat higher rates of withdrawal 
amongst households over the age of 70.  The estimates from the 2007 SCF appear to 
be approximately 82 percent.  
 
Another possible explanation for the low withdrawal rate is that survey 
respondents were confused by or misinterpreted the survey question.
3 They were 
                                                 
3 Low withdrawal rates appear to be a problem with all household surveys.  Sabelhaus and Schrass 
(2009) compare aggregate from the Current Population Survey, the Survey of Consumer Finance and 
the ICI Tracking/IRA Survey with IRA distributions reported to the Internal Revenue Service.  They find 
that the household surveys substantially underestimate withdrawals.  
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asked if they "… receive income from a draw on an IRA/Keogh/401k or Thrift Plan in 
this month?"  Some respondents who withdrew funds from an IRA or 401(k) may 
simply have transferred the funds to a taxable account with the same financial 
institution, and they may not have considered this transaction one that gave them 
income from their PRA.  Holden and Schrass (2010b) report that about 30 percent of 
households (of all ages) making an IRA withdrawal indicate that they "reinvested or 
saved it in another account."   At some institutions, the transfer of funds in conjunction 
with RMD requirements may even be automatic; this may increase the likelihood of 
household mis-reporting.   
      
 
Figure 3-1. Percent of households with PRA 
making a withdrawal, actual and fitted
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The low rate of PRA withdrawal observed in the SIPP, in data collected by the 
ICI, and in IRS data is also observed in the HRS.  Figure 3-2 shows withdrawals based 
on HRS as well as SIPP data for 2004.  There are two key differences between these 
estimated withdrawal rates.  First, the HRS data pertain to withdrawals over a two year 
period, while the SIPP data describe withdrawals over a one-year span.  This creates a 
presumption for the HRS withdrawal rates to exceed the SIPP withdrawal rates.  
Second, the HRS only contains complete information on balances in IRA and Keogh 
plans, while the SIPP data include all 401(k) and 401(k)-like plans, thrift saving plans, 
IRAs and Keogh accounts.  At retirement, many 401(k) balances are rolled over into an 
IRA and thus the IRA balances in the HRS may include assets that were originally 
accumulated in 401(k) accounts.  In spite of the differences in the two data sources, the  
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results in Figure 3-2 suggest remarkable agreement with respect to withdrawal 
behavior.  Both surveys suggest that many households only begin to withdraw funds 
when forced to do so at the RMD age.  Both surveys show that the overall withdrawal 
rate is well under 100 percent following the RMD age.  In addition, the similarity of the 
HRS and SIPP withdrawal probabilities for households in their 60s suggests that the 
households making withdrawals in one year often make withdrawals in the next year as 
well.  If this were not the case, the HRS withdrawal rate, based on two years of data, 
could be as much as twice the SIPP withdrawal rate based on a single year of data.   
 
Figure 3-2. Percent of households in 2004 that 
made a withdrawal during previous two years 
(HRS) or previous year (SIPP)
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  To describe the relationship between household attributes and the likelihood that 
a household makes a withdrawal, we use the SIPP data to estimate a probit model for 
whether the household makes a withdrawal using the same set of explanatory variables 
that we considered in our earlier data analysis. The results, which are reported in Table 
3-1, show the marginal relationship between household attributes and the probability of 
making a withdrawal for households with a PRA.  This table has three columns.  The 
first shows estimates of the relationship between the withdrawal probability and age, 
with age specified as a piecewise linear function with three segments—60 to 69, 70 to 
71, and 72 to 85.   The estimation sample includes all households age 60 to 85.  The 
estimates in column 1 are used to estimate the relationship between age and the 
probability of withdrawal and the predictions based on these estimates are overlayed 
on the actual data on age-specific withdrawal rates in Figure 3-1; this is the “fitted” line 
in that figure.   
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The estimates show that the probability of withdrawal increases by 0.020 per 
year of age (with z-score of 9.94) for households younger than age 69, by 0.199 (z-
score of 25.94) between ages of 69 and 71, and by 0.007 per year of age (z-score of 
4.07) for households over the age of 71.  The large estimate of the effect of passage 
through the age at which RMDs are first required suggests that many households are 
postponing distributions until they reach age 70 ½.   
  
The second column of Table 3-1 shows estimated age and cohort effects.  The 
cohort effects are small and the age effects change little when the cohort effects are 
added.  This finding supports our use of pooled data from all cohorts in constructing 
Figure 3-1.  The estimates in the third column of Table 3-1 add all of the additional 
household attributes to the specification.  Only a few of the household attributes are 
significantly related to the probability of withdrawal.  For all age groups, persons with 
$10,000 or more in PRA balances are about 0.7 percent more likely to make a 
withdrawal.  For the under age 69 group, retired households are 14 percent more likely 
to withdraw.   Households with earned income in all age groups are less likely to 
withdraw assets from their PRAs.  The probability of making a withdrawal declines 
between two and three percentage points for each $10,000 increase in earned income.  
Finally, for households under the age of 69, single persons in poor health are about 13 
percent more likely to make a withdrawal than single persons in very good or excellent 
health. 
 
We compute the predicted probability of a withdrawal using our “high percentile” 
and “low percentile” attributes as in the previous sections; the results are shown in 
Table 3-2.  The probit models in Table 3-1 include the PRA balance as an additional 
covariate that was not included in the probit models of PRA ownership or the nonlinear 
models for PRA balances.  We consequently hold the PRA balance constant at its 
sample mean for both the high- and low-percentile households in Table 3-2.  We 
include annuity income, as well as housing and non-housing wealth, in the set of 
household attributes that we consider even though the estimated effects of these 
variables are typically not significantly different from zero in our probit models.  To 
highlight the effect of the PRA balance, Table 3-2 also includes two additional panels at 
the bottom of the Table showing the relationship between the PRA balance and the 
withdrawal probability.  These panels show averages for the bottom and top quintiles of 
the distribution of PRA assets.  Thus the top panels of this table show the effect of 
households attributes on the probability of withdrawal, holding the PRA balance 
constant.  The bottom panel adds the effect of the PRA balance on the probability of 
withdrawal, allowing it to vary in the same “percentile” fashion as the other household 
attributes.   
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(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Coef Z-score Coef Z-score Coef Z-score Coef Z-score Coef Z-score Coef Z-score
spline in age health status - single persons
   Age≤69 0.020 9.94 0.016 5.79 0.003 0.93    VG or excellent if age≤69 -0.049 -2.13
   69<age≤71 0.199 25.94 0.187 21.23 0.209 11.82    VG or excellent if 69<age<72 0.007 0.16
   Age>71 0.007 4.07 0.006 2.12 -0.001 -0.27    VG or excellent if age≥72 0.015 0.64
cohort effects    Fair or poor if age≤69 0.080 2.52
   Age 54 in 1997 -0.030 -0.51 -0.018 -0.30    Fair or poor if 69<age<72 0.059 0.92
   Age 57 in 1997 -0.023 -0.39 -0.016 -0.27    Fair or poor if age≥72 -0.020 -0.67
   Age 60 in 1997 0.004 0.07 0.003 0.05 health status - married male
   Age 63 in 1997 0.001 0.02 0.004 0.07    VG or excellent if age≤69 0.002 0.10
   Age 66 in 1997 0.023 0.38 0.027 0.43    VG or excellent if 69<age<72 0.096 2.51
   Age 69 in 1997 0.028 0.46 0.050 0.80    VG or excellent if age≥72 -0.026 -1.19
   Age 72 in 1997 0.074 1.18 0.091 1.42    Fair or poor if age≤69 -0.012 -0.51
   Age 75 in 1997 0.066 1.03 0.105 1.59    Fair or poor if 69<age<72 0.025 0.53
   Age 78 in 1997 0.023 0.34 0.080 1.17    Fair or poor if age≥72 -0.055 -2.44
   Age 81 in 1997 0.041 0.56 0.109 1.47 health status - married female
   Age 84 in 1997 0.026 0.27 0.106 1.11    VG or excellent if age≤69 -0.031 -1.81
self-reported retirement status    VG or excellent if 69<age<72 0.009 0.25
   retired if age≤69 0.139 7.83    VG or excellent if age≥72 0.005 0.23
   retired if 69<age<72 -0.002 -0.04    Fair or poor if age≤69 0.002 0.08
   retired if age≥72 0.038 1.25    Fair or poor if 69<age<72 -0.011 -0.21
PRA balance (in 10,000's)    Fair or poor if age≥72 -0.013 -0.52
   PRA balance if age≤69 0.007 13.17 Intercept -1.636 -12.59 -1.394 -7.86 -0.595 -3.05
   PRA balance if 69<age<72 0.007 4.37
   PRA balance if age≥72 0.008 8.65 number of observations 16448 16448 16448
marital status Wald chi2(2) 3688.9 3702.7 3883.6
   Single male if age≤69 -0.006 -0.25 Prob > chi2  0 0 0
   Single male if 69<age<72 0.052 1.11 Pseudo R2    0.2044 0.2054 0.243
   Single male if age≥72 -0.004 -0.14
   Married if age≤69 -0.007 -0.29
   Married if 69<age<72 -0.100 -2.02
   Married if age≥72 -0.030 -1.12
income sources (in 10,000s)
   Earned income if age≤69 -0.020 -5.81
   Earned income if 69<age<72 -0.032 -3.94
   Earned income if age≥72 -0.023 -5.13
   Annuity income if age≤69 -0.003 -0.73
   Annuity income if 69<age<72 0.007 0.75
   Annuity income if age≥72 0.018 3.30
wealth (in 10,000's)
   Housing wealth if age≤69 -0.001 -2.75
   Housing wealth if 69<age<72 0.002 1.63
   Housing wealth if age≥72 0.000 0.08
   Nonhousing wealth if age≤69 0.000 -1.53
   Nonhousing wealth if 69<age<72 0.000 0.04
   Nonhousing wealth if age≥72 0.000 0.16
Variable Variable
Table 3-1 Estimated probability of making a withdrawal, probit marginal effects, households age 60 to 85
 
 
  The results in Table 3-2 highlight two conclusions.  First, households with PRA 
assets in the top quintile are much more likely than households in the bottom quintle to 
withdraw assets from their PRA.  This is true regardless of whether the household is 
retired, and regardless of the household’s age.  For both age groups and for retirees as 
well as non-retirees the difference in PRA assets between the top and bottom quintiles 
is striking.  The average PRA balance is typically about $5,000 in the lowest quintile 
and over $250,000 in the top quintile.  The respondent-reported withdrawal rate for 
older households in the bottom quintile of PRA holdings is extremely low – 31.3 percent 
– and remains a puzzle.  
 
Second, the top two panels show that, holding PRA assets constant, the 
difference between the withdrawal rates of the low- and high-percentile attribute 
households depends on age and retirement status.  For households in the younger age 
range who are not retired the estimated withdrawal probability for the 10
th percentile 
group is over four times as high as that for the 90
th percentile group (0.229 versus 
0.050).  For retired household in this age range the difference is also large but the rates 
are higher for both attribute groups—0.360 versus 0.198.  That is, holding PRA assets 
constant, households who have very limited assets outside their PRA and are in poor  
  20
health are more likely to draw on PRA assets before the age at which distributions are 
required than households who are in good health and who have substantial levels of 
non-PRA assets.  For older households, however, there is little difference between the 
withdrawal rates of the low- and high-percentile group—0.637 versus 0.574 for 
households that are not retired and 0.694 versus 0.729 for retired households.  Not 
surprisingly, once households are required to make distributions, the differences in 
withdrawal probabilities that appear to be related to household attributes are 
moderated.   
 
 
Age
60-69 60-69 72-85 72-85
Not retired
Marital status Single Male. Married Single Male Married
PRA balance mean mean mean mean
Earned income 10th pctile 90th pctile 10th pctile 90th pctile
Annuity income 0 0 0 0
Housing wealth 10th pctile 90th pctile 10th pctile 90th pctile
Nonhousing wealth 10th pctile 90th pctile 10th pctile 90th pctile
Health Fair-Poor Ex-VG Fair-Poor Ex-VG
Probability 0.229 0.050 0.637 0.574
Retired
Marital status Single Male Married Single Male Married
PRA balance mean mean mean mean
Earned income 0 0 0 0
Annuity income 10th pctile 90th pctile 10th pctile 90th pctile
Housing wealth 10th pctile 90th pctile 10th pctile 90th pctile
Nonhousing wealth 10th pctile 90th pctile 10th pctile 90th pctile
Health Fair-Poor Ex-VG Fair-Poor Ex-VG
Probability 0.360 0.198 0.694 0.729
Actual means by PRA quintile
Not retired
PRA balance quintile Bottom quintile Top quintile Bottom quintile Top quintile
PRA balance $4,422 $266,319 $3,935 $283,313
Probability 0.055 0.099 0.313 0.733
Retired
PRA balance quintile Bottom quintile Top quintile Bottom quintile Top quintile
PRA balance $5,967 $281,029 $5,419 $226,693
Probability 0.105 0.342 0.543 0.771
Table 3-2.  Estimated probability of making a withdrawal, for selected attributes.
Attributes and predicted 
probability
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4.  PRA Withdrawal Percentages  
 
Much of the interest in the pattern of withdrawals from PRAs arises from concern 
that households will draw down their retirement account balances either before 
retirement, or early in their retirement years, and then reach their later retirement years 
with very limited resources.  To address this concern, the share of assets that are 
withdrawn from PRAs by those who make withdrawals is the natural measure to 
examine.  The findings of the last section, which suggest that many households with 
PRAs do not begin to make withdrawals from these accounts until they reach the age 
at which minimum distributions are required, suggest that at least a substantial share of 
households with PRAs are maintaining or growing their PRA balances through the early 
years of retirement. 
 
Figure 4-1 shows the percent of total PRA balances withdrawn by age for all 
PRA account holders in our SIPP sample.  This figure, like Figure 3-1, pools data from 
the years 1997, 1998, 1999, 2001, 2002, 2004, and 2005.  This figure shows the rate at 
which PRA assets are being withdrawn from the retirement saving system.  The 
percent of balances withdrawn is calculated as the ratio of average withdrawals to the 
average initial asset balance.  It is equivalent to the sum of withdrawals made by all 
households divided by the sum of initial balances.   Before age 70, the overall rate of 
withdrawal averages about 1.9 percent per year.  In most years, the average real rate 
of return earned on PRA balances would exceed this value, so the pool of PRA assets 
would grow even in the absence of new contributions.  Even after age 70, the average 
withdrawal rate is 5.2 percent.  Over many historical periods, this rate would also fall 
below the average real return on assets held in PRAs.  Since the period we examine, 
1997 until 2005, is a period of relatively favorable asset market returns, our estimated 
withdrawal rates are consistent with the findings in Figure 1-1 of rising real PRA 
balances even after the age at which required minimum distributions begin.   
 
Figure 4-2 compares the PRA withdrawal rate based on SIPP data for 2004 with 
that based on HRS data for 2004.  This is the most recent year for which data from 
both surveys is available.  Recall that the SIPP data include withdrawals from 401(k), 
403(b), thrift plans, IRAs and Keoghs, but the HRS data only include withdrawals from 
IRAs and Keoghs, and that HRS withdrawals span a two-year period while SIPP 
withdrawals correspond to a single year.  To make the HRS and SIPP withdrawals 
consistent, we have divided HRS withdrawals by two to create an estimate of the 
annual withdrawal rate.  The two series show a similar pattern, although the withdrawal 
rate in the HRS is higher before age 70 than that in the SIPP – 2.3 versus 1.5 percent.  
After age 70, the average withdrawal rates in the two surveys are very similar; both are 
roughly equal to 5.1 percent.  This figure suggests that the key conclusion from the two 
data sets for 2004 is similar to that from the SIPP data for all years in Figure 4-1.   
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Figure 4-1. The percent of PRA balances 
withdrawn, SIPP
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Figure 4-2.  The percent of PRA balances 
withdrawn annually, HRS and SIPP, 2004 
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The data in Figures 4-1 and 4-2 describe aggregate withdrawal rates from the 
PRA system, but they do not indicate the withdrawal rate among households making a 
withdrawal.  Particularly before age 70 ½, these two withdrawal rates can differ 
substantially.  Figure 4-3 shows the average percentage of the PRA balance withdrawn 
for households making a withdrawal, calculated as the ratio of the average amount 
withdrawn to the average initial balance for the set of households making withdrawals.  
The average withdrawal conditional on a withdrawal averages 8.2 percent of the 
account balance for ages 60 to 69, 7.3 percent for ages 70 to 79 and 7.4 percent for 
ages 80 to 85.   
 
The owner of a traditional IRA or a 401(k) account must take a required 
minimum distribution (RMD) by April 1st of the year following the year in which he or 
she turns 70 and ½.  The RMD is obtained by dividing the account balance by an 
applicable distribution period taken from the Uniform Lifetime Table published by the 
IRS.  For example, for an unmarried person age 72 or for a married person age 72 
whose spouse is not more than 10 years younger, the distribution period was 25.6 
years in 2006.  Thus the required minimum distribution is 1/25.6 = 3.9 percent of the 
IRA balance in that year.  By age 80 the required minimum distribution is 5.3 percent 
and at age 90 it is 8.8 percent.  These required minimum withdrawal rates are shown in 
Figure 4-3.  It is clear that for households that make withdrawals, the average 
withdrawal after age 70 ½ exceeds the required RMD percentage.  There is one age – 
85 – at which the average withdrawal falls below the RMD requirement, but this is likely 
to be an artifact of the small sample size at advanced ages.  
 
Figure 4-3. Percent of PRA assets withdrawn for 
households who make a withdrawal and the IRS 
required distribution, by age
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Figures 4-1 and 4-3 suggest that households that make a withdrawal take out 
substantially more, on average, than the age-specific average of total PRA funds 
withdrawn.  We now consider the relationship between household attributes and the 
percent of the PRA balance withdrawn, conditional on a withdrawal.  In particular, we 
emphasize the relationship between the PRA balance and the proportion withdrawn 
and the relationship between the age at withdrawal and the proportion withdrawn.  We 
estimate the following model by nonlinear least squares: 
 
(2)   
1 AGEcategory
ii i i WZ B
  
   
 
In this equation, W represents assets withdrawn andB represents the household’s pre-
withdrawal PRA balance.  This specification allows the fraction of assets withdrawn, 
/ ii WB , to depend on i B .  The percentage of assets withdrawn is proportional to a linear 
function of household attributes,  i Z  , and the elasticity of the withdrawal rate with 
respect to the PRA balance depends on the household’s age.  The exponent on i B in 
(2),1 AGEcategory   , allows for different elasticities for households in different age 
categories.  We consider four age categories:  60 to 69, 70 to 71, 72 to75, and 76 to 
85.  We estimate the relationship between the withdrawal rate and the PRA balance 
and household attributes by nonlinear least squares, using the specification in (2), 
rather than by a corresponding log-linear specification in the withdrawal rate because 
the model in (2) has a substantially better fit.   
 
Table 4-1 reports estimates of the model described in (2).  The first column 
shows results with only age and cohort indicator variables as explanatory variables in 
the set of Zi variables, and with age categories in the exponential term for Bi.  The 
estimates in the second column expand the specification to include all of the other 
explanatory variables analyzed in previous sections as part of Zi.  The results in the first 
column indicate that at a given age, households in older cohorts withdraw a larger 
proportion of their PRA balances conditional on making a withdrawal.  The results in 
the second column suggest that few of the other household attributes have statistically 
significant effects on the withdrawal fraction.  Earned income and annuity income are 
negatively related to the proportion withdrawn, but only three of the six estimated 
effects are statistically significant.  Housing and non-housing wealth are positively 
related to the withdrawal proportion in all age intervals but the effects are only 
statistically significant for households over the age of 72.   Retirement status, marital 
status, and health status do not have statistically significant effects on the proportion of 
the PRA withdrawn.  The elasticity of the withdrawal (W) with respect to the PRA 
balance is 0.55 in the 60 to 69 age range, 1.15 in the 70 to 71 range, 1.14 in the 72 to 
75 range, and 1.18 in the 76 to 85 age range.     
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(1) (2) (1) (2)
Coef Z-score Coef Z-score Coef Z-score Coef Z-score
Determinants of 
spline in age health status - single persons
   Age≤69 1.095 3.49 1.270 3.64    VG or excellent if age≤69 0.000 0.72
   69<age≤71 -0.014 -2.73 -0.018 -3.14    VG or excellent if 69<age<72 0.043 0.92
   Age>71 -0.038 -1.89 -0.029 -1.15    VG or excellent if age≥72 -0.082 -1.52
cohort effects    Fair or poor if age≤69 0.029 1.57
   Age 54 in 1997 -0.007 -1.74 -0.007 -1.63    Fair or poor if 69<age<72 0.129 1.92
   Age 57 in 1997 -0.022 -0.35 0.000 0.01    Fair or poor if age≥72 0.043 0.54
   Age 60 in 1997 0.039 0.63 0.070 0.92 health status - married male
   Age 63 in 1997 0.077 1.17 0.109 1.37    VG or excellent if age≤69 -0.022 -1.22
   Age 66 in 1997 0.033 0.49 0.069 0.86    VG or excellent if 69<age<72 0.060 1.89
   Age 69 in 1997 0.088 1.27 0.129 1.51    VG or excellent if age≥72 0.002 0.05
   Age 72 in 1997 0.084 1.21 0.132 1.54    Fair or poor if age≤69 -0.006 -0.30
   Age 75 in 1997 0.105 1.47 0.151 1.74    Fair or poor if 69<age<72 0.032 0.66
   Age 78 in 1997 0.102 1.39 0.159 1.80    Fair or poor if age≥72 -0.020 -0.38
   Age 81 in 1997 0.196 2.66 0.248 2.77 health status - married female
   Age 84 in 1997 0.119 1.49 0.175 1.84    VG or excellent if age≤69 -0.031 -1.50
self-reported retirement status    VG or excellent if 69<age<72 -0.046 -1.32
   retired if age≤69 0.164 1.61    VG or excellent if age≥72 -0.003 -0.05
   retired if 69<age<72 0.076 1.91    Fair or poor if age≤69 0.017 1.05
   retired if age≥72 0.090 1.60    Fair or poor if 69<age<72 -0.066 -1.31
marital status    Fair or poor if age≥72 -0.090 -1.76
   Single male if age≤69 -0.010 -0.34 Intercept 0.120 1.41 0.008 0.43
   Single male if 69<age<72 0.037 0.85 Determinants of β 
   Single male if age≥72 -0.041 -1.08 β (age 60-69) -0.448 -9.95 -0.513 -12.80
   Married if age≤69 -0.021 -1.30 β (age 70-71) 0.153 2.27 0.090 0.99
   Married if 69<age<72 0.093 1.84 β (age 72-75) 0.142 2.10 0.240 2.58
   Married if age≥72 -0.007 -0.11 β (age 76-85) 0.183 2.56 0.283 3.18
income sources (in 10,000s)
   Earned income if age≤69 0.008 0.47 number of observations 6,185 6,185
   Earned income if 69<age<72 -0.008 -2.50 RMSE 1.0775 1.0356
   Earned income if age≥72 -0.022 -1.97
   Annuity income if age≤69 -0.004 -1.69
   Annuity income if 69<age<72 -0.015 -1.83
   Annuity income if age≥72 -0.041 -2.58
wealth (in 10,000's)
   Housing wealth if age≤69 0.004 0.66
   Housing wealth if 69<age<72 0.001 0.98
   Housing wealth if age≥72 0.007 2.56
   Nonhousing wealth if age≤69 0.001 1.43
   Nonhousing wealth if 69<age<72 0.000 -0.04
   Nonhousing wealth if age≥72 0.003 2.46
Variable
Table 4-1  NLLS estimates of the proportion of balances withdrawn for households making 
withdrawals, households age 60 to 85
Variable
 
 
Table 4-2 reports the fitted value of the proportion of assets withdrawn (W/B) for 
households with selected attributes.  The format is the same as that in Table 3-2, with 
the top panel showing the percent withdrawn for sets of household attributes 
conditional on an average account balance and the bottom panel showing the percent 
withdrawn for the top and bottom quintiles of the distribution of PRA assets.  The table 
shows two estimates of the predicted proportion of assets withdrawn: the mean of the 
ratio of withdrawals (W) to balances (B), and the ratio of the mean amount withdrawn to 
the mean balance.
4  For households in the younger age group, whether retired or not, 
the proportion withdrawn is slightly greater for those with low-percentile attributes.  For 
the older age group, however, the proportion withdrawn is more than twice as great for 
those with the high-quintile attributes as for those with the low-quintile attributes.  One 
                                                 
4 The mean ratio is calculated using the predicted W and actual B for each household.  
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potential explanation of this finding is that it is due to reporting differences rather than 
behavioral differences. It is possible that households with higher income and larger 
holdings of assets outside their tax-deferred PRAs are more aware of their PRA 
withdrawal activity, and consequently report this activity with higher probability.   
 
The results in the bottom panel suggest that the PRA balance is a key 
determinant of the proportion of assets withdrawn.  For households in the 60 to 69 age 
range the predicted proportion of assets withdrawn for those in the bottom quintile is 
about 30 percent, compared to about 6 percent for those in the top quintile.  For 
households in the older age range, the predicted proportion of assets withdrawn is 
about 20 percent in the bottom quintile, and again about 6 percent in the top quintile.   
 
 
Age
60-69 60-69 72-85 72-85
Not retired
Marital status Single Male. Married Single Male Married
Earned income 10th pctile 90th pctile 10th pctile 90th pctile
Annuity income 0 0 0 0
Housing wealth 10th pctile 90th pctile 10th pctile 90th pctile
Nonhousing wealth 10th pctile 90th pctile 10th pctile 90th pctile
Health Fair-Poor Ex-VG Fair-Poor Ex-VG
Mean W/B 0.178 0.148 0.048 0.119
Ratio of mean W to mean B 0.092 0.076 0.033 0.083
Retired
Marital status Single Male Married Single Male Married
Earned income 0 0 0 0
Annuity income 10th pctile 90th pctile 10th pctile 90th pctile
Housing wealth 10th pctile 90th pctile 10th pctile 90th pctile
Nonhousing wealth 10th pctile 90th pctile 10th pctile 90th pctile
Health Fair-Poor Ex-VG Fair-Poor Ex-VG
Mean W/B 0.214 0.171 0.043 0.127
Ratio of mean W to mean B 0.110 0.088 0.029 0.089
Actual means by PRA quintile
Not retired
PRA balance (B) quintile Bottom quintile Top quintile Bottom quintileTop quintile
Mean W $2,491 $13,940 $1,506 $18,753
Mean B $7,713 $284,056 $7,969 $353,581
Mean(W/B) 0.337 0.054 0.201 0.060
Ratio of means 0.323 0.049 0.189 0.053
Retired
PRA balance (B) quintile Bottom quintile Top quintile Bottom quintileTop quintile
Mean W $4,080 $18,446 $1,482 $13,955
Mean B $14,010 $307,819 $7,124 $242,536
Mean(W/B) 0.329 0.064 0.231 0.058
Ratio of means 0.291 0.060 0.208 0.058
Table 4-2.  Proportion of assets withdrawn given a withdrawal, for selected 
attritubes.
Attributes and predicted 
proportion withdrawn (W/B)
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The results in Table 4-1 suggest that age is an important determinant of the 
percentage of the PRA balance withdrawn, and that the PRA balance itself is also an 
important influence on withdrawals.  To explore the interaction of these two effects in 
detail, Figure 4-4 shows the average predicted and actual values of W/B for each 
$10,000 interval of the distribution of PRA assets. The figure suggests two conclusions.  
First, the model fits the actual data on withdrawals reasonably well.  Second, the 
withdrawal proportion increases very rapidly as PRA assets decline below $50,000—
going from less than five percent when the PRA balance is $250,000 or greater, to 
about ten percent at a PRA balance of $50,000, to over thirty percent at a PRA balance 
below $10,000.   
 
Figure 4-5 shows the relationship between the PRA balance and the predicted 
withdrawal proportion (W/B) for the 60 to 69 and the “72 and older” age groups.  For 
households with PRA assets of $200,000 or more, the percentage of assets withdrawn 
does not vary much with age for either age group.  At lower PRA levels, however, there 
is a large difference as can be seen by the vertical distance between the two profiles at 
low levels of B.  For example, on average, households age 60 to 69 with PRA assets 
between $20,000 and $30,000 withdraw about 22 percent of their PRA assets each 
year.  Households with the same level of PRA assets in the 72 and older age group 
average withdrawals equal to only 10 percent of their assets.  To provide some context 
for this finding, households in the 60 to 69 age group are predicted to withdraw at least 
10 percent of their assets until they have assets of $90,000 or more.   
 
 
Figure 4-4.  Predicted and actual W/B (mean of ratios) by level 
of PRA assets, all ages
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Figure 4-5.  Predicted ratio of withdrawals to PRA 
balance by level of PRA assets, ages 60-69 and 72+ 
(mean of ratios)
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5.  Household Heterogeneity: The Distribution of Withdrawal Rates  
 
Our analysis so far has used simple probit models to describe how various 
factors affect the probability that a household withdraws assets from a PRA, and has 
demonstrated that a number of household attributes are correlated with withdrawal 
rates.  We have not, however, characterized the heterogeneity in household withdrawal 
behavior.  To do that, we need to characterize differences in both the probability of a 
withdrawal conditional on PRA ownership, as in Figure 3-1, and in the proportion of the 
PRA that is withdrawn, conditional on a withdrawal, as in Figure 4-1.  Together, these 
two inputs determine the distribution across households of the proportion of PRA 
balances withdrawn – a distribution with many entries at zero for younger households.    
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Figure 5-1.  Percent making a withdrawal, percent 
of balance withdraw given withdraw, and percent 
withdrawn for all PRA owners
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Before considering this distribution, we summarize the average patterns of 
withdrawals at different ages.  Figure 5-1 pools data on households of various ages in 
all cohorts.  It shows that the average percentage of households who own a PRA who 
make a withdrawal increases from 11.4 percent at age 60 to 23.6 percent by age 69.  
This percentage jumps to over 60 percent by age 71, when the age of the household 
head exceeds the age at which RMDs must begin.  The percentage of assets 
withdrawn by households that make a withdrawal is about nine percent at age 60.  It 
declines to between seven and eight percent between ages 68 and 76, and, while it 
becomes somewhat more variable after that age, falls below seven percent at many 
ages in the late 70s and early 80s.   The average percentage of all PRA assets 
withdrawn, which is the product of the two foregoing series, is about one percent at age 
60.  It rises to about 1.8 percent by age 69, then jumps to about five percent by age 71 
and fluctuates around that level through age 85.   
 
Figures 5-2 and 5-3 describe the heterogeneity in withdrawal percentages for 
households with heads between the ages of 60 to 69, and over the age of 72, 
respectively.  Both figures show the distribution of households by the percentage of 
their PRA balance that they withdraw.  For households aged 60 to 69, i.e. before the 
age at which required minimum distributions must begin, withdrawals of a large 
proportion of the PRA balance are rare.  The vertical lines in Figure 5-2 indicate that 
about 83 percent of households make no withdrawals, and that 90 percent of 
households make an annual withdrawal of less than five percent from their PRA.  Only 
seven percent of households withdraw more than ten percent of their PRA assets.    
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Figure 5-3 shows that for households older than 71, after RMDs begin for the 
household head, most withdrawals are still modest.  The percentage of households 
making large withdrawals from their PRAs is substantially greater for this group, 
however, than for the younger group.  The vertical lines in Figure 5-3 indicate that 59 
percent of households withdraw less than five percent of their PRA balances and 77 
percent withdraw less than 10 percent.  Nearly a quarter of the households in this older 
group, however, withdraw more than ten percent of their PRA, and 11 percent withdraw 
more than 20 percent.  Our results from the previous section suggest that the 
households withdrawing large fractions of their PRA balances tend to have low 
balances.  Some households may withdraw a large proportion of PRA assets because 
of special circumstances, such as illness of a spouse or entry into a nursing home.  
Understanding the correlates of large withdrawals is an important topic for future study.   
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Figure 5-2.  Distribution of percent of PRA 
balances withdrawn in a year, all households age 
60 to 69 with a PRA account
Note:  83 percent make no withdrawal
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Note:  30 percent make no withdrawal
 
 
6.  Summary and Discussion   
 
  We use data from the SIPP and the HRS to investigate withdrawals from 
personal retirement accounts (PRAs).  We find a relatively modest rate of withdrawals 
prior to the age at which households are required to take minimum required 
distributions.  Only seven percent of PRA-owning households between the ages of 60 
and 69 take annual distributions of more than ten percent of their PRA balance, and 
only 17 percent of PRA households in this age group make any withdrawal in a typical 
year.  The rate of distributions rises sharply after age 70 ½, when minimum 
distributions are required.  The proportion of PRA-owning households making a 
withdrawal jumps to over 60 percent by age 71, and crosses 70 percent a few years 
later.  The sharp increase in withdrawals when distributions become mandatory 
suggests that many households in their early 70s would not make withdrawals if it were 
not for the RMD rules.   
 
  The low rate of withdrawals from PRAs during our sample period, 1997-2005, 
combine with investment returns to PRA assets and contributions by some still-
employed PRA-owning households to generate an upward-sloping pattern of average 
PRA balances by age.  Rather than declining in value after households retire and begin 
to finance retirement consumption, our findings suggest that PRA balances continue to 
grow through at least age 85, although the rate of growth is slower at older ages than at 
younger ages.  On average, households age 60 to 69 with PRA accounts withdraw only 
about two percent of their account balances each year, considerably less than the rate  
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of return on account balances. Even at older ages—after the required minimum 
distribution age--the percentage of balances withdrawn remains at about five percent 
which, for most years in our sample, was below the average return on PRA assets.     
 
  While average withdrawal rates are low, there is substantial heterogeneity 
across households, and some withdraw a significant proportion of PRA assets.  Among 
households headed by someone between the ages of 60 and 69, roughly ten percent of 
PRA owners make an annual withdrawal of five percent or more of their PRA assets, 
and about seven percent withdraw more than ten percent of assets.  At ages 72 and 
older, after required distributions begin, 59 percent of households withdraw less than 
five percent of their PRA balance in a typical year, and 77 percent withdraw less than 
10 percent of balance.  On the other hand, eleven percent of those over the age of 72 
withdraw more than twenty percent of their balance.   We view these results as 
consistent with a general pattern of conserving PRA assets for most households.   
 
  There are substantial differences not just in withdrawal rates but also in PRA 
balances across households.  While we estimate that only eight percent of households 
in the lowest decile of non-PRA wealth, income, and health status have a PRA as they 
approach retirement, about 80 percent of households in the top decile of non-PRA 
wealth, income, and health status have such accounts.  We find that even after 
controlling for other assets, households in poor health are less likely than those in good 
health to have a PRA.   With regard to withdrawal behavior, we find that among 
households approaching retirement, whether a withdrawal is made varies greatly with 
the PRA balance; households with higher balances are more likely to make a 
withdrawal than those with lower balances.  Among those who make a withdrawal, the 
PRA balance is the most important determinant of the proportion of assets withdrawn.   
 
  We note two important limitations of our current analysis.  First, withdrawals from 
PRAs do not necessarily translate into consumption: households may simply re-direct 
their assets from PRAs to other investment accounts.  While there are substantial tax-
based arguments for households prior to age 70 ½ to draw down non-PRA assets prior 
to PRA assets to fund consumption, whether households follow these rules is not clear.  
After age 70 ½, when households face required minimum distributions, it is more likely 
that some assets which are withdrawn from PRAs are transferred to other investment 
accounts.  Integrating the analysis of PRA withdrawals with a broader investigation of 
household wealth at older ages is a key priority. 
 
  Second, our analysis excludes individuals who die between waves of the SIPP.  
Whether death-induced withdrawals should be aggregated with other withdrawals from 
PRAs depends on the purpose for which one is calculating the withdrawal rate.  If the 
goal is to understand how PRAs are serving the retirement income needs of long-lived 
households, is seems appropriate to exclude those who die at an early age from the 
analysis.  On the other hand, if the goal is to understand how long assets are held in 
the PRA system, which might be relevant for some types of tax analysis, then it is more 
important to recognize that death can be an important factor in generating withdrawals 
from the retirement saving system.  
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  One of the most important research priorities for future analysis is integrating our 
analysis of withdrawal patterns with explanations of why households choose to save.  
Our evidence is consistent with the view that most households conserve PRA assets 
for a “rainy day.”  Venti and Wise (2004) found something similar with respect to home 
equity, which tended to be held until a shock to family status occurred.  They argued 
that households might want to remain in their home as long as possible, and they may 
also want to save their housing assets as a buffer against potentially large expenditures 
associated with illness or death of a spouse.  Similar explanations may apply to PRA 
assets, which are a key source of liquid funds for many households.  Households may 
want to preserve these funds for contingences such as entry to a nursing home or other 
large health care expenditures.  Marshall, McGarry, and Skinner (2010) find that out-of-
pocket health care costs when calculated based on exhaustive use of all information in 
the HRS are much larger than costs based on direct responses to questions about 
expenditures.  They estimate that at the 95 percentile health care costs are about 
$100,000 per person over a five-year period.  EBRI (2009) estimates that men 
approaching retirement will need anywhere from $68,000 to $173,000 in assets to have 
a 50-50 chance of covering insurance premiums and out-of-pocket medical expenses 
in retirement and $134,000 to $378,000 if they want a 90 percent chance of covering 
these expenses.  Asset reserves needed to fund medical expenses are even higher for 
women.  The role of PRA accumulations in supporting precautionary saving objectives 
warrants further study.   
 
  Precautionary saving motives naturally raise two other related issues: the 
adequacy of retirement saving, and the role of annuitization in protecting households 
against longevity risk.  With respect to the former issue, if households are holding 
PRAs and other assets to self-insure against late-life health shocks, many households 
that do not suffer major health shocks may die holding substantial asset balances, and 
appear on some metrics to have “over-saved" for retirement.  In the presence of self-
insurance, however, this interpretation may be misplaced.  Our results do not inform 
this issue, or the question of whether households are drawing down their wealth in 
retirement at the appropriate rate.  But they could provide clues for further investigation.  
 
  Similarly, if households are concerned about late-life expenditure risks, they may 
choose not to annuitize all or even most of their wealth at retirement.  The lack of 
annuitization of most PRA assets has attracted attention from researchers and policy-
makers, but the optimal degree of annuitization must depend on the risks that 
households are attempting to insure against, and the set of assets – including housing 
equity – that households can draw on in the event of adverse outcomes.  Having some 
liquid assets to draw on in an emergency is valuable, and for many households PRA 
assets may be the single largest source of liquid assets.  The role of PRA assets in 
supporting the diverse array of potential financial needs in retirement is a topic that 
warrants further attention, particularly as the maturing defined contribution pension 
system makes PRA assets a more important component of household wealth at 
retirement. 
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